

Challenges for regional and interregional security cooperation in the Atlantic area facing illicit networks.

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Human Security has been a dominant conceptual paradigm that shaped the Security Strategies in the decades after the Cold War introducing a multidimensional approach. The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the changes in the international system that have been taken place in the last two decades impacted in the Security Strategies of the main actors in the Atlantic Space, how have affected the Human Security agendas and specifically the opportunities for the design and implementation of regional and inter-regional cooperation programmes and instruments to fight against the increase of transnational criminal networks related to drugs trafficking.

The international security agenda experienced major transformations following the end of the bipolar world after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The growing globalization and interdependence of the states and the emergence of new powers fostered diverse alliances in the transition to an increasingly multipolar and heterogeneous world (Grevi, 2009). In addition to these changes, there were other transformations resulting from the new regional dynamics of cooperation and integration and from the progressive expansion of the Security Agenda towards a more comprehensive approach including both the traditional conventional, state-centered military concerns, as well as 'non-traditional security' issues (Soriano, 2019). In the 1990s, "the idea of human security rekindled the debate over what security means and how best to achieve it" (Acharya, 2018)

These changes affected the composition, nature and functions of regional security bodies; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expanded its membership and geographical composition, as well as the scope for intervention under the then nascent principle of the responsibility to protect. In the Americas, the traditional role of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) under the leadership of the United States (US) was questioned, and subregional organizations were created in search of greater autonomy and improve regional cooperation as mechanisms to balance the hegemonic power (Weiffen, Wehner and Nolte, 2013). In Africa, the creation of the African Union (AU) in 2001 to replace the Organization for African Unity led to the creation of a Peace and Security Council, which also sought to play a greater role in the regional settlement of conflicts on the continent. All these initiatives highlighted the growing role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter¹.

¹ Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security for which the Security Council is primarily responsible. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/regional-arrangements-chapter-viii-un-charter>.

At the same time, as the institutional evolution took place, there was a process of expanding the Security Agenda towards issues related to multi-level international governance in the face of transnational threats. In this direction, the mentioned concept of Human Security, inspired by the work of the Nobel Prize in Economics Amartya Sen and promoted by the first UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 (UNDP; 1994), had a great influence. In addition to the academic debate that generated its definition and scope (Roberts, 2005), this concept had a strong influence on the definition of strategies and policies in subsequent years. One of the effects was an extension of the security environment to previously unrelated areas and the increase of the number of actors involved in security policies in the face of complex and transnational problems. The agenda evolved from a nation-centric notion to a people-centric notion of security (Acharya, 2018).

As the meaning of security issues has widened, the number of cooperation initiatives to address it spread (Kotsopoulos, 2014). Nowadays, as underlined by the United Nations Development (UNDP) Administrator, Achim Steiner, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) included in the 2030 Agenda are also embedded in the concept of Human Security recognising the “humanitarian-development–peace nexus”², and specifically the SDG16 about Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions is key in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. The peace and Security are included in many other elements of the Agenda in at least seven SDG’s more, and experts had proposed a set of interactions comprised in the concept SDG16+ to englobe a comprehensive agenda of positive peace (Sanahuja, 2019).

Security today is conceived as a multidimensional phenomenon and is incorporated into regional and inter-regional cooperation processes as spaces for intermediate consultation, balance of power and the promotion of global governance. This interregional cooperation includes a diversity of bilateral, regional and multilateral, formal and informal structures and the interaction between all these actors had been characterized as multilateral forums (Soriano, 2019; 2). It has been highlighted that the existence of overlapping regional Security institutions configure a regimen complexity with different institutions that are “intersecting and influencing each other on the facto basis” (Weiffen, Wehner and Nolte, 2013). But this mutual influence is also perceived in interregional relations as we will see in the Atlantic Space.

One of the current trends in the international security environment in the last decades was the fragmentation of the security arrangements to face transnational treats (VV.AA, 2017). To overcome the possible negative effects of that, one response has been to build coalitions between different partners and actors from different regions. In this way, “interregional cooperation may influence the shared knowledge and understanding of different stakeholders on the nature and extent of global security challenges” (Soriano, 2019; 3) contributing to fortify multilateral global governance and “norm convergence on security matters across regions” (Santini, Lucarelli, and Pinfari, 2014).

² Speech “25th Aniversary of the Human Security concept”.
<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/speeches/2019/25th-anniversary-of-the-human-security-concept.html>

The EU has been incorporating the security agenda in the political dialogue and cooperation with other regions and this issue is now present in all interregional relations, including those in the Atlantic area. Although there is not always geographical contiguity, there are transnational problems that are connected across the different sides of the Atlantic, especially those related to transnational crime and not traditional security issues such as drug trafficking.

Interregionalism emerged as a path to provide instruments to strengthen the international response against transnational crime with hybrid institutional structures and “the emergence of new mechanisms and institutions of global governance that go beyond traditional forms of state-led, treaty-based regimes” including multi-actor perspectives (including States, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, scientific experts, civil society groups, networks, partnerships, private military and security companies criminal and drug-trafficking networks) (Jinseop, MsParrenand and Rashchupkin; 2016:2). However, in the last years, the President Donald Trump impulse a shift in the US Security Strategy that directly impact the Transatlantic Agenda and the hemispheric relations, with systemic consequences. The new priorities of the Trump 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) favours competition, not cooperation, and weaken international bodies like United Nations Security Council or NATO (Boot, 2017) undermining the security cooperation instruments.

The main objectives of this paper are; first, to analyse the strategic, legal and institutional frameworks to fight against organised crime in the Atlantic area, pointing convergences and divergences; second, to identify the existing instruments of interregional cooperation between the main actors of the Atlantic Area in the field of the fight against organised crime related to drug trafficking; third, to highlight the main problems and opportunities for better cooperation in the Atlantic area in the fight against drug trafficking organised crime according to the paradigm of Human Security.

1. Converging Narratives of Human Security

In April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept at their Summit meeting in Washington. Teen years after the end of the Cold War this statement recognized that “the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict”³ and that “a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share.” In the statement, it was considered that the security of Europe and that of North America were indivisible and that the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO.

Nonetheless, during decades the European Union has been a working to develop the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with its own identity which, although not

³ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

defined in opposition to the transatlantic agenda with the United States, does have its own characteristics. This vision was reflected in the first European Security Strategy (ESS) entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World" adopted on 12 December 2003. This policy orientation document was based on the assertion that the EU members had to assume more responsibility both, for its own security, and for the protection of the international community security as a whole. In identifying the main threats, the strategy noted that the further opening of borders and the increase in international flows of all kinds was inextricably linking the internal and external aspects of security issues (Kaldor, 2007). Threats were thus associated both, with classic defence issues (weapons of mass destruction or regional conflicts), and with broader issues involving terrorism, other organised crime and the breakdown of states. The EU's geographical priorities were clearly focused on the neighbourhood countries, while reiterating that the transatlantic relationship was "irreplaceable" and then mentioning other areas such as Asia or sub-Saharan Africa and only incidentally Latin America.

On 29 November 2006, the Comprehensive Political Guidance⁴ was endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government providing a political framework for the continuing transformation to adapt the organization to the changes in the world context. The document recognised that peace, security and development were more interconnected than ever and "instability due to failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and their causes and effects; the growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources" were the main risks. A Management Mechanism was established to better coordinate and ensuring coherence and harmonisation. In 2010 a new NATO Strategic Concept "Active Engagement, Modern Defence"⁵ was adopted to guide the next phase in NATO's evolution. But the NATO core tasks continued to be; Collective defence, Crisis management and Cooperative security. The last one includes Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation through political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and organisations across the globe. Other international organized crimes are not part of the NATO objectives.

A parallel process took place in the Americas; the OAS Declaration on Security was adopted in October 2003. As in the case of Europe, the new concept of hemispheric security broadened the traditional notion of defence to incorporate the new threats "which include political, economic, social, health and environmental aspects" (OAS, 2005). This document stated that the fundamental objective is the protection of people and that a multidimensional approach is necessary for this purpose. Thus, the hemispheric strategy of the OAS and the EU converged in 2003 by incorporating the concept of Human Security in the definition of security objectives and in the broadening scope of the agenda.

In the following years, the difficulties in establishing a joint Security agenda within the OAS and the desire of emerging regional powers to gain autonomy from the US led to the emergence of other regional security agendas in the Americas based on different levels of regional cooperation and integration. This was the case of the South American

⁴ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_56425.htm

⁵ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm

Defence Council (CDS, acronym in Spanish) created by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, acronym in Spanish), that was supposed to create a South American defence identity that would contribute to the stability among the countries of South America. The Santiago Declaration of March 2009 linked the CSD's action to the strengthening of regional integration and agreed on a four-pronged⁶ Defence Action Plan. In addition, in November 2009 it was agreed to draw up a Protocol on Peace, Security and Cooperation that would constitute a South American Security Architecture and serve as a Code of Conduct for the region. Although it was not presented as opposed to the hemispheric strategy of the OAS and intended to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the CSD was supposed to be an important step in the construction of a differentiated South American space (Bayer, 2013).

UNASUR created too the South American Council on the World Drug Problem in May 2010. The objective was the development of a South American identity to address this global problem and to achieve common positions in international forums. Finally, in November 2012, the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime of UNASUR was created, which, according to the creation statement, should "combine its tasks with the South American Council on the World Drug Problem" due the existence of common thematic areas between the two Councils. To promote the coordination of policies on citizen security, justice and actions against Transnational Organized Crime among the member States, the Council's objectives included improving the capacity to accomplish the international commitments acquired by the country members.

As seen, the construction of South America as a region with its own set of rules and conflict resolution regimes for Security issues was one of the priorities developed within the UNASUR initiatives (Bragatti, 2019). But, before the existence of UNASUR, the Andean Community (CAN, acronym in Spanish) member countries had already proposed the construction of an Andean Peace Zone, through the Lima Commitment on 17th June 2002. This commitment, reiterated in the Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Defence meeting in Quito on 24 May 2006, also incorporated a broad vision of regional security beyond mere pacification to look at the political, economic, social and cultural situation of peoples, covering domestic, international, regional and global issues (Ayuso and Beltran, 2007). This led to the development of Common External Security Policy (CESP) Guidelines and the establishment of the Andean Common External Security Executive Committee. The 2001 Andean Plan for Cooperation in the Fight against Illicit Drugs and Related Crimes (decision 505) and the 2003 Andean Plan for the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of the Illicit Trade in Small and Light Weapons (decision 552) were developed as instruments. Decision 587 announced the creation of an Andean Security Network (REDSA, acronym in Spanish),

⁶ The four priorities were: 1) The creation of an information network on defence policy that provides transparency in defence expenditure, makes it possible to define conceptual approaches, identify risks and agree on common positions in multilateral forums; 2) military cooperation in joint operations in the event of disasters, peace operations or humanitarian operations; 3) promoting joint initiatives to improve the capabilities and complementarity of defence industries; 4) creating a training network on defence and the South American Centre for Strategic Defence Studies (CSEED).

made up of political, business, academic and non-governmental organizations to promote social dialogue.

In Central America and Mexico, crime and violence associated with drug trafficking and transnational crimes became a major problem that prompted the launch of the Central American Security Strategy in December 2007. It updated and strengthened the 1995 Democratic Security Treaty. The strategy aimed to involve all sectors of society and international cooperation in a common effort in line with the transnational dimension of the problem. For the implementation of the strategy within the framework of the Central American Integration System (SICA, acronym in Spanish), the Security Commission prepared an Action Plan that was revised at the International Conference to Support the Central American Security Strategy held in Guatemala in June 2011, where was approved the establishment of a coordination, evaluation and follow-up mechanism.⁷

In Africa, the African Union started implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as articulated in the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC). In parallel other subregional bodies also faced growing security challenges, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC). They also developed regional and international cooperation programs. SADC established in 1996 the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security to cooperate for Peace keeping and peace building, but also for the prevention of cross border crime and promote a community-based approach to domestic security. This institution developed other initiatives like the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security (revised in 2010), the Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2002), the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs in the Southern Africa (1996), or the creation in 1995 of the Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) specialized in cooperation on cross-border crime.

ECOWAS has also developed numerous protocols which address conflict prevention as the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (PRMCR). In 2008 the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was elaborated based in the concept of human security and its multifaceted approach (Kotsopoulos, 2014). ECOWAS developed a Regional Action Plan to address the growing problem of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa (2008-2014) that was renewed for 2015-2020. All these institutions maintain cooperation with other actors in the Atlantic region.

Given the nexus between peace, security and development, the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Roadmap 2016–2020 intended ensure further progress and pave the way for better collaboration between the AU, and the Regional

⁷ The strategy is based on four components, which include: 1) combating domestic and transnational crime; 2) preventing all types of violence, including the prevention of risks arising from climate change-related disasters; 3) rehabilitation, reintegration and prison security; and 4) institutional strengthening of the State apparatus responsible for developing and implementing the security strategy at the national, national and local levels.

Economic Communities⁸ (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs) to effectively address security issues and contribute to a more peaceful Africa (AU, 2015). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the RECs⁹ provides the framework for cooperation under the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage in order to strengthen coordination towards their shared goal for sustainable peace, security and stability on the continent.

In the South Atlantic the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) was created in 1986 with the objective of cooperation in security and Defence and the development of the region. Created and integrated by 24 countries¹⁰ on both sides of the Atlantic, it has the recognition of the United Nations General Assembly as a regional cooperation agency (resolution 41/11). The organization does not have an institutional structure and because of the lack of material resources and the consultative nature of the organization it has not been able to project its influence (Palacios, 2018). The most important achievement was the declaration of denuclearization through the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty¹¹ and the support for the demilitarization of the southern Atlantic area. At the Montevideo Summit in 2013, a Declaration and Plan of Action was approved that included cooperation in the area of maritime security, Defence, public security and combating transnational organized crime, however, the concretion in concrete projects hadn't continuity.

As we have seen, the EU, Latin America and Africa new initiatives in the field of security were based on a diagnosis of the Security threats as a multidimensional problem that requires a comprehensive approach aimed at the origin of the social, economic and politic structural causes. The Human Security concept has permeated security strategies and brought closer the Security and Development agendas. This trend coexisted with the progressive development of the regional bodies and strategies aimed at strengthening regional orders as a contribution to the maintenance of international Peace and Security within the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The growing multipolarity of the international society was a shaping factor facilitating interregional cooperation to identify mechanisms that address common threats while strengthening the identity of regional spaces. The multidimensional dimension of security treats and the impossibility of finding strictly security answers to global challenges required strategies that tackle the original sources of the conflicts. It was supposed that, putting human security at the centre of inter-regional dialogue and designing a set of cooperation actions around this objective should facilitate a gradual progress in the establishment of specific instruments to balance the burden sharing of

8 The AU recognizes eight RECs: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Southern African Development Community (SADC); Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)

⁹ <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/AUMOURECSJUN08.PDF>

¹⁰ Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Conakri, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Saint Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo and Uruguay.

¹¹ <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba>

shared responsibilities. Although with difficulties, this has been the trend over the past few decades, but changes in the current context could increase the sources of conflict and undermine the space for cooperation.

2. The changing context in the Atlantic Security Space.

As said, Europe, Latin America and Africa traditionally had their regional security agenda linked to the United States, but at the same time they were seeking to affirm their own space to expand their margin of autonomy. Donald Trump's arrival to the White House has been a turning point with repercussions on the traditional Atlantic Alliance that forces Europe to rethink its role in the global security agenda. The new US National Security Strategy adopted in December 2017 starts with the statement that define Trumps vision of the role of the US in the world "America First Foreign Policy: America Great Again." The document stresses the idea that US face an extraordinarily dangerous world with threats intensified in recent year and that unfair burden sharing with the traditional allies and the inadequate investment in Defence harm the country's strategic interests.

The main threats identified are; the defeat Jihadist Terrorist; dismantle transnational criminal organisations and promote American resilience; strengthen border control and immigration Policy; and safer Cyber space. Following a broader concept of security, the strategy includes economic security issues and claims to lead research innovation, reinforce energy dominance and to renew competitive advantages regarding partners. The objective is to increase American influence in the world and promote a development model consistent in: free market principles, fair and reciprocal trade, private sector activity and rule of law. In this direction the aim is to reform international institutions and shape them according American values. Regarding the relationship with Europe, the strategy require all NATO members assume greater responsibilities, increase to 2% of GDP military spending and improve counterterrorism and cybersecurity cooperation.

In the Western Hemisphere, Cuba and Venezuela are considered major treats and the change of regime is conceived as a priority. But to assure that US financial system do not serve as a heaven or transit points for criminal proceed is also a priority and reinforce the rule of law, the judicial reform and improve information sharing to target criminals and corrupt leaders. In Africa the end of long-running conflicts; the attention to humanitarian needs; the reinforcement of the rule of law and the institutions accountability are considered major treats and support economic integration and improve security services against terrorism, human trafficking and illegal trade in arms and natural resources are the main priorities. Regarding the previous strategy of the Obama's Administration we can appreciate different perspective on the causes of Security treats and instruments to be implemented, but still a broad concept of Human Security is maintained. However unilateral action and primacy of national interest is prevalent and international cooperation is approached as a zero-sum game in which the United States must reinforce its pre-eminent position.

The new EU Global Strategy for the European Union's foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) named "Shared Vision, Common Action: Stronger Europe"¹² approved by the European Council in 2016 also emphasise the need for Europe to assume a more active role in Security, the interconnection between Internal Security and International Security treats and the need to seek allies and strengthen regional bodies and orders. The EUGS stress the necessity to promote a rules-based global order to manage interdependence and root causes of conflict and work with core partners and regional groupings. Invest in the resilience is one of the main concepts of the EUGS and not only related to the States but also to promote more resilient societies. In doing so, a comprehensive approach to face conflicts and crises through a coherent use of all policies should be adopted. The broad vision of the concept of Human Security is still present and even reinforced.

The EUGS backs support to voluntary forms of regional governance to better manage security concerns and to transform the existing system and develop coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-states actors. Supporting complex regional orders and building coalitions of hybrid institutional structures is part of the global governance understood as a multi-level structure of variable geometries. This vision doesn't seem to fit well with Trump's Agenda that prioritizes bilateral relations and the US dominant position. Trump's defiant attitude at the 2018 NATO Summit and the Brexit acted as catalysts for the EU initiatives to strengthen security policies¹³, but Europe's weaknesses have also evident in the fragmented reactions to face crises such as the refugees or the terrorist attacks.

In Latin America, UNASUR and the different Councils created during the last decade are in an existential crisis due the inability to provide a common response to the Venezuelan crisis. Six of its 12 members decided to suspend their participation (Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Paraguay) "until the proper functioning of the organisation is guaranteed"¹⁴. In March 2019, the president of Ecuador, the country that houses the headquarters of UNASUR, announced the denunciation of the Constitutive Treaty¹⁵. With only 5 member countries (Bolivia Venezuela, Uruguay, Guyana and Surinam) the institution has not a General Secretary and once finished the rotatory presidency of Bolivia no other country assumed the leadership. Some authors emphasize that "from the outset UNASUR possessed the germ of its current crisis and its potential self-destruction, due to the lax organization design, the pre-eminence of national autonomies over regional integration and the lack of a supranational institutionality of the block" (Bragatti, 2019).

In parallel, on 22 March 2019, the Forum for the Progress of South America (PROSUR, acronym in Spanish) was created, which is defined as a space for dialogue and collaboration for its member countries and is intended to replace UNASUR. Argentina,

¹² https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

¹³ In 2018 EU and its Member States decided put in place a set of new measure and tools to increase the effectiveness of their actions, e.g. through new command structures for military training missions or policies to strengthening the civilian dimension of CSDP.

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35285/towards-stronger-eu-security-and-defence_en

¹⁴ <https://www.france24.com/es/20180421-unasur-paises-miembros-retiran-bloque>

¹⁵ <https://twitter.com/lenin/status/1106017987587383302?lang=es>

Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Guyana were the eight founding countries but Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay participated as observers. It is difficult to know how this will affect the existing Councils and initiatives created in UNASUR as the South American Defence Council or the organs like the "Drug Observatory of the Member States of the Union of South American Nations"¹⁶ that was being developed since 2014.

For the time being, the Venezuelan crisis continues to generate a paralysis in the dialogue mechanisms created in the region, such as CELAC, while other *ad hoc* mechanisms, like the Lima Group, are created introducing more confusion in the regional security landscape. In March 2019, Bolivia assumed the presidency *pro tempore* of CELAC after a meeting of foreign ministers who wanted to put an end to the differences that impeded the change of presidency for more than a year. It will be a challenge for Bolivia to hold the Summit of presidents who have not met for two years. These disagreements have also affected the political dialogue with the EU, which for the last two years had to replace the summits of Heads of State by meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers.

The OAS's action also shows fragility facing internal crisis in member States and the current US Administration's lack of interest in a constructive dialogue increased the fragmentation. But in non-traditional security issues like drug production and trafficking the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)¹⁷; the Department of Public Security (DPS)¹⁸ and the Department Against Transnational Organized Crime (DDOT)¹⁹ are a solid cooperative structure in technical assistance but with limited operational capacity. The CICAD continues to be the largest instrument of regional cooperation, but its mandate is restricted to the coordination for the monitoring of drug trafficking and consumption and the exchange of information. In turn, cooperation on drugs, arms and human trafficking is confronted with the unilateralism of the US Administration. The regime complexity of multiple bodies with overlapping competences (Weiffen, Wehner and Nolte, 2013) is now facing a competence between UNASUR and PROSUR that threaten the effectiveness of the established instruments for cooperation.

Political differences among OAS's member states, polarization and confrontation have prevented the consolidation of a shared vision of hemispheric security challenges. On the other hand, the political changes in countries that promoted initiatives like UNASUR, such as Brazil and Argentina and the collapse of Venezuela have weakened the structures created as instruments of balance of power. These two tendencies place the regional security regime in a context of transition, redefinition of the alliances and reorientation of cooperation strategies and practices. The participation of Colombia in

¹⁶ <http://unasursg.org/es/node/436>

¹⁷ The main objectives are: Information sharing, capacity building, technical assistance, design alternative policies, sustainable alternative Development, and multilateral evaluation System.

¹⁸ The main objectives are: Information and knowledge, security legislation, prevention of violence and crime, undocumented migration police professionalization, reintegration homicide prevention and reduction. Meeting of Ministers responsible of Public Security in the Americas.

¹⁹ The main objectives are: Anti-money Laundering, assistance programs to strengthening capabilities; Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Plan.

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the bilateral dialogue of some other countries with partners outside the region like Russia or China are also factors that undermine the regional cooperation in Security issues (Bragatti, 2019).

Africa is undoubtedly the continent that faces the most risks related to Human Security in the Atlantic Space. In addition to armed conflicts and fragile institutions face major challenges on non-traditional security issues. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is “an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction”²⁰. The key institutions are the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) and the Peace Fund. As said these structures interact with the regional structures like the ECOWAS and SADC and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The interaction between the APSA institutions and the regional structures is crucial (Lins de Albuquerque, 2016) and together they compose a complex regional order in different levels interacting with extra-regional actors that contributed with financial resources and technical cooperation. However, the APSA Assessment Report notes that the existing architecture has been unable to coordinate preventive diplomacy processes at either the AU and sub-regional level “with the result of there sometimes being numerous separate, yet overlapping, initiatives addressing the same crisis or conflict” (Lins de Albuquerque, 2016: 12). Another weakness is the strong dependence of donors funding that limits the capacity of operative initiative.

The mentioned APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 document²¹ established five strategic priority areas: Conflict prevention (incl. early warning and preventive diplomacy); crisis/conflict management (incl. ASF and mediation); post-conflict reconstruction and peace building; strategic security issues (such as illicit flows of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), mines, explosives and improvised explosive devices (IED), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), disarmament, counter-terrorism, illicit financial flows as well as transnational organised crime and cybercrime); and coordination and partnerships. In addition, cross-cutting issues – such as gender-mainstreaming in peace and security and climate change are included. This comprehensive approach is embedded in the concept of Human Security and linked with the Development Agenda. “The Agenda 2063. The Africa we want”²² was adopted by the African Union in 2013 and includes the objective to build a peaceful and secure conflict-free continent. The 2063 Agenda aims to provide internal coherence and coordination to continental, regional and national frameworks and plans adopted. Organized crime, drug trafficking and illicit financial flows are identified as some of the threats to achieve the objectives of the agenda.

²⁰ Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, preface, July 2002

²¹ African Union, African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016-2020, December 2015, 23. <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf>

²² <https://au.int/agenda2063/overview>

Within the Flagship Projects of Agenda 2063, “*silencing the guns by 2020*” search to work towards ending all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts and preventing genocide. To measure the progress in the areas the project proposed the establishment and operationalization of an African Human Security Index (AHSI)²³ The concept of Human Security in the West African context and ECOWAS response to the security challenges as arms trafficking, drug trafficking and trafficking in persons continue has been widely part of the debate in the specialized literature (Luka Dajahar and Alheri Walnshak, 2018). The transnational nature of criminal networks makes it very difficult for any individual country to face the problems and the international and regional cooperation is recognized in the specific regional strategies. There is an acknowledgment of the threats to human security in the subregion of organized crime and that “the problem is probably not yet properly understood or that the approach is skewed” (Luka Dajahar and Alheri Walnshak, 2018) and a more articulated approach is needed.

In overhale, the concept of Human Security is well established in all regions around the Atlantic, although there are divergences when referring to the scope of the Security Strategies in each region and specificities are given according to their context and priorities. In addition, the existence of multiple regional overlapping institutions has led to some fragmentation and in many cases competition that hinders the convergence of the security regimes. Next, the analysis of how the strategies to fight against transnational Drug Trafficking were developed will be made.

3. The fight against Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Atlantic Security Strategies.

The Atlantic basin concentrates some of the main drug trafficking routes in the world; South America produces almost all of the world's cocaine with Colombia, Bolivia and Peru as main suppliers and the largest markets are the United States and the EU. Europeans consume a quarter of the world's total cocaine production, just behind the United States. On the other hand, the US and the EU are also growing producers of oncoming synthetic drugs, as well as illegally diverted precursor chemicals used to manufacture drugs of natural origin. Cocaine production continues to grow, although the amount of cocaine intercepted in the last decade has also increased by more than 74 per cent (World Drug Report 2019). The routes of illicit transnational flows have been diversifying and becoming more complex (Ayuso and Viilup, 2014), in terms of the type and variety of existing drugs, drug trafficking routes and their connection with other international crimes such as arms trafficking, human trafficking or money laundering. For this reason, the world drug problem has become a priority object of political dialogue and cooperation on security in transatlantic and hemispheric relations in all their dimensions.

Cooperation in this area is based on the principle of shared responsibility and has evolved and broadened its areas of work. In this process of exchange, the visions and approach of the different countries and actors involved have been coming closer together, but there are also disparities that determine the strategies at the international

²³ <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/flagship-projects>

level led by the UN and the multilateral treaties²⁴ and the regional strategies such as the hemispheric through the OAS, the successive European strategies against drugs and the sub-regional strategies that have been created in the Andean area, in South America and in the African continent.

Synergies have been established between these different spaces, but there are difficulties in coordinating operations and programmes. This is partly due to the fact that cooperation is very fragmented and national authorities are reluctant to share certain resources and information, but there are also difficulties deriving from different ideological visions. The positions oscillate between prohibitionist strategies, a frontal war on drugs, and other strategies that defend decriminalisation and the total or partial regulation of their production and distribution (Pedraza Rosales, 2014). These differences prevent significant steps from being taken to transform the current international regime on drug treatment. For decades a false dilemma has been debated between models of reductionist policies: either focused on the persecution of producers and consumers, as was the case with the war on drugs declared by the United States during the Bush Administration, or only taking into account the causes and consequences of consumption, as was intended by some European countries. The failure of both models (Gratius 2012) has led to a rethinking that seeks a paradigm shift in the way this global problem is dealt with in a more multidimensional way. But there is still no consensus on how to achieve this.

The importance given to the fight against illicit drug trafficking is not the same in the major security strategies developed in the Atlantic area. The European, North American, Hemispheric and African strategies place different emphasis on the intensity and focus of the problem. Next, the different interregional strategies will be analysed in order to take stock of convergences and divergences. The objective is not to make an exhaustive analysis of all the content of each of the strategies, but to identify those aspects related to international cooperation in fighting transnational crimes that could affect the global strategy led by the United Nations and to identify obstacles and opportunities for better collaboration.

The United States Approach.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America approved in December 2017 divided the Pillar I in four parts: 1) Secure U.S. Borders and Territory and 2) Pursue the Threats to their Source 3) Keep America Safe in the Cyber Era 4) Promote American Resilience. The fight against the transnational criminal organizations is placed in the part two, organized in two chapters: Defeat Jihadist Terrorists and Dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations. Regarding the last one, the strategy says “The United States must devote greater resources to dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and their subsidiary networks. Some have established global supply chains that are comparable to Fortune 500 corporations.” According with

²⁴ The main instruments are the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the Vienna Convention against Trafficking Illicit drug and psychotropic substances of 1988. In addition to the successive Political Declarations and Action Plans on International Cooperation adopted within the framework of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations.

the strategy, “these organizations weaken our allies and partners too, by corrupting and undermining democratic institutions. TCOs are motivated by profit, power, and political influence.” In addition, “some state adversaries use TCOs as instruments of national power, offering them territorial sanctuary where they are free to conduct unattributable cyber intrusions, sabotage, theft, and political subversion”

The priority actions envisaged are:

Improve strategic planning and intelligence: establishing national-level strategic intelligence and planning capabilities and the ability of agencies to work together to combat TCOs at home and abroad.

Defend communities: Supporting public health efforts to halt the growth of illicit drug use, expanding prevention efforts, increase access to evidenced-based treatment for addiction and providing training on substance use disorders.

Defend in depth: U.S. agencies and foreign partners will target TCO leaders and their support infrastructure. We will assist countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, to break the power of these organizations and networks.

Counter cyber criminals: use sophisticated investigative tools to disrupt the ability of criminals to use online marketplaces, crypto currencies, and other tools for illicit activities.

The Strategy provides also regional specificities for priority actions: for the Hemisphere, the military and security priorities include to build local efforts and encourage cultures of lawfulness to reduce crime and corruption, including by supporting local efforts to professionalize police and other security forces; strengthen the rule of law and undertake judicial reform; and improve information sharing to target criminals and corrupt leaders and disrupt illicit trafficking. For Africa, the military and security strategy include working with partners to improve the ability of their security services to counter terrorism, human trafficking, and the illegal trade in arms and natural resources. Regarding Europe the security issues include measures against terrorism, but don't make reference to Drugs Trafficking

Complementarily, the US “*National Drug Control Strategy*”, a report made by the Office of National Drug Control Policy in January 2019, establishes three fundamental elements that form the heart of this Strategy: prevention, treatment and recovery, and reducing availability. All three “are complementary and mutually supporting”. The Chapter on reducing the availability of illicit drugs in the United States establishes different objectives: Disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Drug Traffickers and their supply chain; Working with International Partners; Combating illicit Internet Drug sales; Federal Government Effort Against Illicit Drug delivery through the mail and express consignment networks; Interdicting the flow of Drugs across the physical borders and into the United States; Disrupting and dismantling the illicit Drug production infrastructure; Leveraging the full capabilities of multi-jurisdictional Task Force Programs; Interrupting the financial activities of Drug traffickers; and enhancing Law enforcement capacity. These priorities show a defensive approach focused on the interdiction and punishment of transnational crime.

Hemispheric and Sub regional Approach.

Due to the instability and governance problems it creates in the region, the fight against drug trafficking occupies a pre-eminent place in the Hemispheric Agenda. The illicit trafficking of narcotics and the organized crime that accompanies it has generated tensions between states that have negative repercussions on regional integration and cooperation processes (Ayuso and Beltran, 2007). The Andean Zone, as a centre of coca leaf production, was the place where the first attempts at regional cooperation on these issues began, but in the mid-1980s it became a hemispheric concern in the OAS. (Ruiz-Cabañas, 1998). At the beginning of that decade, drug trafficking had already taken on dimensions that had made the hemisphere the main producer and consumer of drugs. Most of the counter-narcotics actions designed to combat the problem were repressive in nature and designed and financed by the United States (Interamerican Dialogue, 2001).

In April 1986, the first Inter-American Program of Action to Combat the Illicit Production and Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was approved in Rio de Janeiro. The mission of the Rio Program of Action was to contribute to the fulfilment of the global strategy against drug trafficking through specific control mechanisms, technical cooperation to improve the legal and institutional instruments of the countries of the Americas, and periodic monitoring of the information provided by States. In line with the objectives of the subsequent United Nations Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, it was a strategy primarily aimed at the repression of illicit drug trafficking. In 1986, the OAS General Assembly created the CICAD, which was configured as technical support to develop the legal, administrative and operational capacities of national policy governments.

The 2003 OAS Declaration on Security recognized that the security of the states in the Hemisphere was affected in different ways, by challenges like terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, and the connections among them. It also stressed that subregional and regional integration processes should contribute to stability and security in the Hemisphere. The members States were committed to fully implementing the obligations of the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and improve coordination and technical cooperation to strengthen national institutions dedicated to preventing and sanctioning these transnational crimes and identifying and prosecuting members of transnational criminal organizations.

The last Hemispheric Drug Strategy²⁵ was approved by the OAS in May 2009. The Strategy covers the following areas: institutional strengthening; demand reduction; reduce the illicit supply of drugs; control measures and achieve effective international cooperation. To reduce the illicit supply of drugs, member states should; adopt and/or improve the mechanisms needed to gather and analyse information in order to prepare assessments that will facilitate the development of public policies in this field; reduce of illicit cultivation and support integral sustainable alternative development programs²⁶;

²⁵ file:///V:/PROYECTES/Under%20execution/Jean%20Monnet%20-%20Atlantic%20Network/Security/Documents/4.%20Am%C3%A9rica%20Latina/1798_Strategy-eng.pdf

²⁶ According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Alternative Development is a process aimed at reducing and eliminating the cultivation of plants that contain narcotic drugs, as well as psychotropic substances offering other crops as alternatives.

identify and monitoring of new and emerging trends that could provide updated information; reduce negative consequences to the environment caused by the world drug problem.

To achieve effective international cooperation, member states agree that they should foster international cooperation programs aimed at strengthening national policies; promote the harmonization of national legal norms in order to implement hemispheric judicial cooperation mechanisms and mutual legal assistance; promoting and strengthening joint or coordinated operations and exchanging information and best practices; promote technical assistance; implementation of the recommendations that emanate from evaluation process of the objectives of the Strategy.

The Hemispheric Plan of Action on Drugs 2016-2020²⁷ adopted in October 2016 characterize “the world drug problem manifests as an increasingly complex, dynamic and multi-causal phenomenon” and acknowledges the connection with the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. The Plan of Action sets same five strategic areas established in the Strategy and identifies objectives and priority actions to be developed by 2020. In the area of Supply Reduction the plan recommends “Strengthening of interagency cooperation to provide a comprehensive response to the illicit production of drugs, in the framework of the responsibilities and mandates of each agency, including collaboration among the public and private sectors and the international community.” In order to collect and analyse information for the development of policies and actions the plan recommends the revision and update of the mechanisms used for collecting and analysing information related to the illicit supply of drugs. The Supply Reduction Plan also call for: the design and implementation of long-term programs aimed at rural and urban alternative, integral and sustainable development programs; to mitigate and reduce the impact of illicit crops and drug production on the environment; and establish the effects caused by small-scale drug trafficking on public health, the economy, social cohesion and citizen security based on evidence.

In the Area for International Cooperation the Action Plan 2016-2020 propose promoting cooperation; to foster technical assistance, improve exchange of information and experiences, and share best practices and lessons learned on drug policies and related crimes; to strength coordination mechanisms in the area of forfeiture and management of assets derived from drug trafficking and related crimes, as money laundering; the development of policies, protocols and programs for the effective and secure exchange of operational intelligence at the international level; support the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), process, assuring the progress and compliance of the commitments undertaken by member states; the respect of the international legal instruments related to the world drug problem, with respect for human rights; and promote common understanding of national legal norms, regulations, and internal procedures for the implementation of hemispheric judicial cooperation mechanisms and mutual legal or judicial assistance.

²⁷ [file:///V:/PROJECTES/Under%20execution/Jean%20Monnet%20-%20Atlantic%20Network/Security/Documents/4.%20Am%C3%A9rica%20Latina/Final_Draft_PLAN_OF_ACTION-2016-2020_ENG%20\(1\).pdf](file:///V:/PROJECTES/Under%20execution/Jean%20Monnet%20-%20Atlantic%20Network/Security/Documents/4.%20Am%C3%A9rica%20Latina/Final_Draft_PLAN_OF_ACTION-2016-2020_ENG%20(1).pdf)

At the subregional level in February 2018, UNASUR approved the Action Plan of the South American Council on the World Drug Problem and the 2018-2019 Biennial Operational Plan, however, the institutional crisis of the organization puts in stand by its effective implementation.

The EU Approach.

In the European Global Strategy “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe.” from June 2016 the reference to Drugs trafficking could be embedded generically in the Chapter 3.1 devoted to the Security of Our Union: Security and Defence, Counter-terrorism, Cyber Security, Energy Security, Strategic Communications but we can’t find a specific reference. In the Chapter 3.2 “State and Societal Resilience to our East and South” a generic reference is done regarding “the challenges of migration, energy security, terrorism and organised crime are shared between the EU, the Western Balkans and Turkey” and proposing to ensure that the security sector reform efforts enable and enhance EU partners’ capacities to deliver security within the rule of law.

The Chapter 3.4 related to Cooperative Regional Orders establish specific goals to the different world regions according with the shared global responsibilities. Regarding the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa the EUGS propose to support functional multilateral cooperation on issues as border security, trafficking, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, water and food security, energy and climate, infrastructure and disaster management, and addressing cross-border dynamics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions through closer links with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel. Regarding the Atlantic relationship the EUGS only mention the countering organized crime and illicit flows in the short reference to the multilateral ties with the CELAC and other regional groupings.

So, the attention to the problem of drugs in the EUGS is very limited. However, the EU had developed a strong strategy about drugs along decades. The last one is EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020²⁸, adopted in March 2013, that served as a basis for two consecutive 4-year EU Drugs Action plans. It provides a common framework for responding to the drugs phenomenon within and outside the EU, for coordinated and joint actions and that forms the basis and political framework for EU external cooperation in this field. The Strategy claims for an integrated, balanced and evidence-based approach and is structured around two policy areas; drug demand reduction and drug supply reduction, and three cross-cutting themes: (a) coordination, (b) international cooperation and (c) research, information, monitoring and evaluation. Drug supply reduction includes the prevention and dissuasion and disruption of drug-related, in particular organised, crime, through judicial and law enforcement cooperation, interdiction, confiscation of criminal assets, investigations and border management.

²⁸ file:///V:/PROJECTES/Under%20execution/Jean%20Monnet%20-%20Atlantic%20Network/Security/Documents/2.%20UE/drugs-strategy-2013_content.pdf

International cooperation is considered a key area where the EU adds value to Member States efforts in coordinating drug policies and addressing challenges. The EU external relations in the field of drugs are based on the principles of shared responsibility, multilateralism, an integrated, balanced and evidence-based approach, the mainstreaming of development, respect for human rights and human dignity and respect for international conventions. The EU and its Member States should guarantee the integration of the EU Drugs Strategy and its objectives within the EU's overall foreign policy framework as part of a comprehensive approach that makes full use of the variety of policies and diplomatic, political and financial instruments at the EU's disposal in a coherent and coordinated manner. The High Representative, supported by the EEAS, should facilitate this process.

The last Action Plan on Drugs 2017-2020²⁹ from July 2017 also calls for International cooperation strengthening the dialogue and cooperation between the EU and third countries and international organisations on drugs issues in a comprehensive and balanced manner. As in the strategy the mandate is to integrate the EU Drugs Strategy within the EU's overall foreign policy framework. This means to fully integrate drug issues within the political dialogues and framework agreements between the EU and its partners and in the EU advocacy on global issues or challenges.

The Plan calls for a balance between demand and supply reduction reflected in policy options and in the programming, implementation and monitoring of external assistance through projects, particularly in source and transit countries. Also, in these countries the EU should promote and implement the EU Approach to Alternative Development consistent with the EU Drug Strategy 2013-2020 and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development 2013. Finally, the Plan proposes to support third countries to tackle drug-related organised crime by: a) intelligence-sharing and the exchange of best practices; b) strengthening counter-narcotics capacity and developing expertise of source and transit countries; c) working with international partners to tackle the enablers of drug trafficking such as corruption, weak institutions, poor governance and lack of financial regulatory controls; d) strengthening cooperation in the field of asset identification and recovery, in particular through the creation of dedicated national platforms; e) intensifying regional and intra-regional cooperation f) incorporating rule-of-law and international human rights standards and principles in drug-related law enforcement measures.

The Plan also claims for better coordination in international fora including the UN General Assembly and other specialized bodies or the Dublin Group³⁰ with the preparation, coordination and adoption of EU common positions and joint resolutions to contribute shaping the agenda on international drugs policy. Finally, the EU wants to contribute to a better understanding of all aspects of the drugs phenomenon and of the impact of measures in order to provide sound and comprehensive evidence for policies

²⁹ <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/attachments/5642/eu-action-plan%27-on-drugs-2017-2020.pdf>

³⁰ The Dublin Group is a informal consultation and coordination mechanism for global, regional and country-specific problems of illicit drugs production, trafficking and demand. It is based on consensus and mutual assistance. Its participants cooperate taking into account the UN Conventions on narcotic drugs and the work being done on the basis of these instruments by other groups or organisations. <https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vkeg9ge2kztl>

and actions. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)³¹, established in 1993, is one of the EU's decentralised agencies of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The aim is to provide the EU and its Member States with a factual overview of European drug problems and a solid evidence base to support the drugs debate and to help professionals and practitioners working in the field. But EMCDDA also have the mandate to cooperate with international partners. The International Cooperation Framework, updated in 2018, recognises the critical importance of pursuing synergies and maintaining effective working arrangements with other relevant EU agencies and international organisations, especially United Nations organisations (EMCDDA, 2018).

The African Approach.

The priority 4 of the APSA Roadmap 2016, devoted to Strategic Security Issues, establishes the specific objectives to fight against illicit flows. The focus is placed in anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The initial diagnosis is that the existing international mechanisms are insufficient and inefficient due to multiple factors that include inadequate capacity among institutions but also inadequate inter-state cooperation. The APSA Roadmap pursues the effectively implement international legal instruments and recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)³² and the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa Recommendations³³ presented to the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in January 2015.

The main objectives are: to establish and/or strengthen Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) with effective mandates and capacities; to facilitate regular exchanges and common understanding; to enhance inter-state cooperation; to compile operational guidance notes on best practices; to organize joint trainings to address cash couriers and cross-border transportations of currency; to provide technical and legislative support to the States in regulating operations of non-profit organizations; to train the police, the judiciary, the office of the prosecutor and other authorities on investigation, including capacity building in asset recovery; and to develop integrated approaches and policies to address terrorism, trafficking and smuggling. To improve the Coordination combating Transnational Organized Crime AU Member States agreed in 2014 to establish African Police Cooperation Mechanism (AFRIPOL) for police cooperation at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The AFRIPOL Statute was adopted in January 2017³⁴.

The Strategic Priority for of the Roadmap on Coordination and Partnerships also calls for the coordination of AU institutions and the other African regional Bodies through clarifying and agreeing on the concepts of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage; developing a strategy document making the concept of

³¹ <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/about>

³² The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdiction. Currently comprises 37 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organisations. <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/>

³³ https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf

³⁴ <https://au.int/ar/node/32548>

coordination operational clear; and developing institution-to institution dialogues. As explained, the APSA Roadmap didn't develop the fight against Drugs illicit flows in deep, but only the connection with other illicit flows. But the Drug problem had been addressed in the region from other multiple sides.

The AU Plan of Action on drug control (2013-2017)³⁵ was the fourth revised Plan of Action developed by the AU in response to emerging challenges associated with the increase use of almost all types of drugs over the past few years and emerging trends in trafficking patterns. To the widespread trafficking on cannabis it was detected significant amounts of cocaine trafficked from South America to Europe via West Africa and African and East Countries are increasingly being used to ship Afghan heroin to final destinations in Europe and other regions. The increase of drug abuse in Africa among growing youth urban population is also troubling. In 2007, UNODC produced a special report on cocaine trafficking in West Africa highlighting that in the three-year period 2005–2007 tons of cocaine for Europe seized in West Africa, augmented from 1 ton annually to 33.

The reasons to explain this phenomena were multiple including “the decline of cocaine demand in the US relative to Europe (West Africa being geographically advantageous as a route to Europe); relative success in interdiction of cocaine in the Caribbean and other traditional routes; and, especially, factors inherent to West Africa — weak and politically unstable states, widespread corruption, porous borders, poor law enforcement practices and capacity, existing networks for trafficking of a variety of illicit products, and a ready and inexpensive workforce for smuggling and trafficking activities” (Csete and Sanchez, 2013).

The region has become increasingly an epicentre for illegal activities associated with drugs, firearms and human trafficking. According to UNODC's 2018 World Drug Report, West and Central Africa together with North Africa countries accounted for 87 per cent of the pharmaceutical opioids trafficked for non-medical use. The Sahel is another area of focus of terrorism and organized crime, including drug trafficking. The collaboration between some government employees and the criminal was outlined as one of the greatest impediments to upholding the rule of law, socio-economic development and human rights. The nexus between drug trafficking cartels, corrupt government officials, and suspected terrorist elements in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa was identified as a threat for international security.

The AU Plan of Action outlines four key priority areas: a) Continental, regional and national management, oversight, reporting and evaluation; b) Evidence-based services scaled up to address health and social impact of drug use in Member States; c) Countering drug trafficking and related challenges to human security through supporting to reduce illicit trafficking and supply reduction in accordance with fundamental human rights principles and the rule of law; d) Capacity building in research and data collection enhanced through strengthening of institutions to respond effectively to challenges posed by illicit drugs. The Plan of Action was addressed to the African Governments and regional institutions, in particular the RECs and the African

³⁵ https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32900-file-aupa_on_dc_2013-2017_-_english.pdf

Union Commission and its programmes. The Plan was extended until 2019 and currently the African Union is discussing the next “African Union Plan of Action of Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2019-2023)” to be considered and adopted by the end of 2019.

ECOWAS has been also implementing his own strategy to make face to the threats posed by drugs in West Africa. The current Drug Action Plan to Address Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in the West Africa 2016-2020 was adopted in September 2016 by the ECOWAS Ministers of Justice and Interior. ECOWAS Plan focuses on reinforcement of the region’s capacity to fight drug trafficking, drug abuse and crime. The Plan has been supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime through the “Regional Action Plan on Illicit Drug Trafficking, Related Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa” who made a Midterm Review in 2018. This report underlines the relevance of the project but point out that it was “not sufficiently operationalized and not adequately tailored to the ECOWAS region” (UNDOC, 2018). UNDOC work focuses on establishing inter-agency cooperation platforms as AIRCOP, the West Africa Coast Initiative, the Container Control Programme, the Network of West African Central Authorities and Prosecutors against Organized Crime, and the ECOWAS regional action plan on illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse. It is essential that the States of the region strengthen the capacities of the concerned institutions.

Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger created in 2014 the G5 Sahel as a way of taking their security and encouraging regional development by coordinating their efforts. To support G5 was created in 2017 the Sahel Alliance to foster cooperation between major development partners and Sahel countries. The police component of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, “will focus on strengthening the capacity of the Joint Force in tackling terrorism and organized crime, including drug trafficking”³⁶.

From the above, we can affirm that in all regions of the Atlantic, have been developed specific Strategies for the fight against the world drug problem and that in all of them regional and interregional cooperation are of crucial importance to fulfil the objectives.

4. Scope of interregional instruments for cooperation against transregional illicit trafficking.

Once the complex multilateral framework of anti-drug strategies and institutions has been identified, the objective of this chapter is to analyse the main interregional cooperation instruments that have been developed to assess their scope and the extent to which they contribute to an integrated response to the common and global problem of illicit drug trafficking. It is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of each programme and its results, but rather to provide an overview of existing instruments in order to identify overlapping, synergies and prospects for cooperation.

³⁶ United Nations Security Council 8433rd Meeting Wednesday, 19 December 2018, 3 p.m. New York https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8433.pdf

EU- Latin America Cooperation

The EU's cooperation with LAC in this field has combined political dialogue, the granting of trade advantages and development cooperation. The first EU cooperation actions focused on the Andean countries and date back to the 1990s. One of the first was precisely a Triennial Plan (1990-1993) for Colombia which included alternative development projects to coca cultivation and cooperation projects not specifically linked to drugs. The importance of the issue in relations with this region led to the birth of the EU-CAN High Level Specialised Dialogue on Drugs in 1995. Subsequently, in 1998, the Joint EU-LA Dialogue on Drugs was set up, the first of which was launched in 1999.

The first Global Action Plan on Drugs for the EU-LAC was adopted at the EU-LAC Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, where the bi-regional strategic partnership was established and the EU-LAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs was created. It incorporated the 1999 Barbados and Panama Action Plans and was developed by the Lisbon Priorities adopted in 2000 which included demand reduction, alternative development, money laundering and maritime cooperation. This mechanism for dialogue, in addition to allowing cooperation to materialize, should serve to bring the strategies closer to a shared position that would balance supply reduction and demand reduction policies (Armenta, Jelsma and Metal, 2006). In addition to reiterating the principle of shared responsibility, the dialogue insisted on an integrated approach.

EU-LAC cooperation has developed, on the one hand, projects aimed at the control of substances and trafficking and, on the other hand, has established some international cooperation projects for alternative development focused mainly on the Andean area. In parallel the European Commission granted special treatment to the Andean countries in the General System of Preferences (GSP) to encourage alternative exports to drug trafficking³⁷.

In the area of substance control, between 2004 and 2006, the Andean Community, with EU resources and the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Office in Colombia, executed the "Prevention of diversion of chemical precursors for drug manufacturing in the Andean countries" Project PRECAN, which contributed to the development and implementation of national policies for the control and control of precursor chemical substances and made possible the application of the "Andean Standard for the Control of Chemicals Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" (Decision 602). Subsequently, the experience was extended to the region as a whole with the project "Prevention of diversion of drug precursors in the Latin American and Caribbean region" (PRELAC), created in 2009 and developed in collaboration with the UNODC until 2016.

Between 2007 and 2010, the Project to Support the Andean Community in the Area of Synthetic Drugs (DROSICAN) was developed, which included both the prevention of consumption and the strengthening of national drug observatories for the standardization and standardization of information. The experiences accumulated in

³⁷ This regime, called GSP-Drugs, was created in 1991 and prolonged until December 2005 when it has been transformed into a broader treatment open to other countries due to the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.

these LAC programs and in other regions and the fact that drug trafficking networks are increasingly trans-nationalised along routes that cross several regions led the EU to reorient its strategies towards more interregional instruments, adopting the notion of "drug routes"³⁸. This gave rise to the "Cocaine Route" Programme created in 2011. This initiative aims to combat cocaine trafficking by coordinating the actions of law enforcement and the judiciary from the Americas to Europe through West African countries. The action incorporates: the Airports Programme (AIRCOP); the Sea Ports Control Programme (SEACOP); the Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD, acronym in Spanish) to improve the capacities of police authorities; and the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT, acronym in Spanish, formerly GAFISUD) against money laundering and organised crime. In addition, the Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support (CORMS) project aims to improve synergies between all elements of the Cocaine Route program.

Further, the program Strengthening criminal investigation and criminal justice cooperation along the cocaine route in Latin America, the Caribbean and West Africa (CRIMJUST) was created through an agreement between the EU and UNODC in December 2015 with the aim of strengthening cooperation in criminal investigations and criminal justice along the Cocaine Route. It is a four-year (2016-2020) project, CRIMJUST-UNODC aims to strengthening criminal investigation and criminal justice cooperation along the cocaine route in complementarity with the other projects of the Cocaine Route Programme. This initiative is a first attempt to address illegal trafficking across the Atlantic basin with three regions involved overcoming the corset of regional strategies.

The launch of the ambitious COPOLAD programme on 31 January 2011, which is now in its second phase (2016-2019) was intended to give coherence to cooperation on drug policy based on four components: consolidation of the existing coordination mechanism, strengthening of national drug observatories in LAC and capacity building in the fields of supply reduction and demand reduction, respectively. The strengthening of the dialogue mechanism includes the organization of conferences and training workshops to improve knowledge and the exchange of good practices. The strengthening of the Observatories includes the review of the indicators collected by CICAD, on the Latin American side, and the EMCDDA, on the European side, as well as those of national observatories or other bodies working in this area, with a view to seeking a synthesis, improving the mechanisms for collecting and processing information and developing methodological tools to help fill existing gaps.

The EU also collaborated in the creation of AMERIPOL, the Community of Police of America. It is a hemispheric, integrated and coordinated cooperation mechanism, whose purpose is to promote and strengthen police cooperation in scientific technical matters, training to make information exchange more effective for intelligence

³⁸ The notion of 'drug routes' is particularly used in the case of cocaine and heroin. The routes define, the movement – and the counter-measures from cultivation to entry points to the European market and include both the producing and transit countries for these drugs. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/407/eu-external-policy-drugs_en

purposes. Its aim is also to coordinate and strengthen sustained actions of criminal investigation and judicial assistance among the police forces and / or homologous institutions of America.

The GAFILAT-EU³⁹ project provides support to the Member States of the Financial Action Task Force of South America (GAFILAT, acronym in Spanish) in their fight against money laundering within the overall framework of the international standards⁴⁰, defined by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)⁴¹ in 2012. The project also aims fostering cooperation lines to fight asset laundering and formalizing agreements with countries and/or regional groups promoting inter-institutional coordination and multidisciplinary working groups, improving the existing investigation capacities and strengthening of police and judicial cooperation to fight asset laundering. GAFILAT is also the Secretariat of the Latin-American regional Asset Recovery Network (RRAG, acronym in Spanish).

In 2017, a new Europe-Latin America program was launched for Assistance against Transnational Organized Crime called EL PACCTO that seeks to strengthen capacities and facilitate international cooperation. It consists of technically assisting the States of Latin America, contributing to strengthening the rule of law, supporting the security forces and bodies of the States of Latin America, promoting judicial and fiscal cooperation, developing more modern, efficient and respectful penitentiary systems, with human rights and promoting cross-border, regional and international cooperation⁴².

In offer reduction, the aim is to help identify priorities and implement an interactive system to support planning, implementation and evaluation. It aims to improve and facilitate access to evidence-based information that is useful for decision-makers, public administrators and demand reduction practitioners and to agree on a minimum set of quality standards. One important objective is to reduce the dependence of populations on coca in areas affected by cultivation. To this end, case studies have been carried out to identify good practices, exchange forums have been held and guides have been published to help design new alternative development programmes.

Alternative Development activities have been carried out mainly through bilateral programmes with the countries most affected by illicit crop cultivation. The EU and its member States are the main donors for such projects in Latin America. Many of them have been carried out in collaboration with UNODC, which promotes such initiatives. Peru, Bolivia and Colombia have been the main recipients. In 2006, the horizontal working group on drugs of the Council of Europe approved the European perspective on Alternative Development (European Commission, 2010). Evaluations showed problems with programme implementation due to institutional weakness, large and persistent social inequalities and the limited resources employed, indicating that the

³⁹ https://cocaineroute.eu/content/uploads/2018/01/GAFILAT_infosheet_v2_250118.pdf

⁴⁰ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html>

⁴¹ FATF is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 with the objectives to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial System. <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/home/>

⁴² <http://www.elpaccto.eu/en/about-el-paccto/que-es-el-paccto/>

political priority given to it is insufficient (Addicks, Hübner-Schmid & Cabieses, 2010). In the case of Colombia, Alternative Development has been highly conditioned also by the persistence of the government's armed conflict with the insurgent guerrillas of the FARC-EP and the ELN.

The experiences of the "Peace Laboratories" in Colombia were pilot programs with positive results, but they did not achieve either a global decrease in crops or displacement to other territories beyond the reach of national development institutions and policies. Within the COPOLAD program, since 2016, an intra-regional dialogue on alternative development was also initiated, whose main objective is to provide opportunities for learning and information exchange on recent best practices and innovations. The 4th Forum was held in La Antigua, Guatemala⁴³ and gave special emphasis on gender-based approaches in Alternative Development.⁴⁴

EU- Africa Cooperation

The EU-Africa partnership framework was established at the first Africa-EU summit in Cairo in 2000. The EU also provides funding and capacity building for the SADC, the EAC and ECOWAS. The focus of the support and capacity building was primarily to promote economic integration, but a considerable part of the funds have been allocated to security issues, especially through ECOWAS (Ayuso, Mattheis and Viilup, 2016). In Africa, especially on the East coast and the Sahel, drug, arms and human trafficking networks have been set up taking advantage of the weakness of institutions in some countries in the region that are unable to face them without international cooperation. ECOWAS and the EU have established frameworks for cooperation, but to make them effective they need multidimensional international support covering the many facets of the problem (WACD, 2014).

In the context of the Cocaine Route Program the EU collaboration include, as in the case of Latin América, different components: AIRCOP, SEAPORT and CRIMJUST are still ongoing. The AML/WA project, designed to enhance inter-regional anti money laundering skills and capacities in four West African countries (Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal), ended in January 2016. This project supported participating countries in exchanging information on financial investigations and on asset recovery issues and collaborated in the formation of an Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for West Africa (ARIN-WA)⁴⁵ launched in 2014 to undermine cocaine trafficking by taking the profit out.⁴⁶

The EU and Interpol supported the creation of a West African Police Information System (WAPIS), a programme aimed at sharing information on transnational crime in

⁴³ <http://copolad.eu/en/actividades/actividad/197>

⁴⁴ The 1st Intra-regional dialogue forum in Alternative Development analyzed the conclusions obtained in the UNGASS and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in this field. ; The 2nd meeting was on "Effective mechanisms for interrupting the routes taken by the illicit cocaine trade"; The 3rd one looked back at the progress made on integrating Alternative Development into the public policies of the different countries.

⁴⁵ <https://www.wacapnet.com/>

⁴⁶ As RRAG in Latin-America, ARIN-WA in one of the regional Networks operating around the world with different legal and institutional basis.

<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup2/2018-June-6-7/V1803851e.pdf>

the region between ECOWAS member states and Mauritania. The objective is better information sharing to develop a regional enforcement strategy against transnational crime. WAPIS seeks to develop national police databases and then link these into a regional system under the auspices of ECOWAS. It also aims to increase the police information exchange between countries from the region through the Data Collection and Registration Centres (DACORE), that allows to centralise digital police information and to share it. WAPIS activities under the Cocaine Route Program ended in 2016, but the system continues with funding from other EU financial instruments.

AIRCOP is a multi-agency between UNODC, INTERPOL and the World Customs Organisations (WCO) that aimed at strengthening the capacities of international airports in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Middle East to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers in both origin, transit and destination. AIRCOP also collaborates with other UN agencies and international organisations, such as the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED); the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Air Transport Association (IATA); regional entities such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the G5 Sahel.

On the other hand, the objective of SEACOP, now in the IV phase, is to support the fight against maritime illicit trafficking and associated criminal networks providing the means (equipment, IT tools and related skills); to reinforce seaport control and intelligence capacities; setting up, consolidating and equipping dedicated units in seaports or sensitive coastal areas; improving or establishing national maritime information systems; enhance the operational delivery and cooperation at national, regional and trans-regional levels.

Designed in 2010 as part of the Cocaine Route Program, AIRCOP is a project implemented by UNODC in partnership with INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization (WCO). Its objective is to create inter-operational groups to strengthen the capabilities of international airports to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers, including terrorist, in countries of origin, transit and destination.

The Project CRIMJUST-UNODC, as said before regarding Latin-America, aims to strengthening criminal investigation and criminal justice cooperation along the cocaine route in cooperation with INTERPOL and Transparency International. The project seeks to enhance the capacities and integrity of criminal justice institutions for regional and inter-regional cooperation to tackle drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. It has a strong focus on criminal investigations and criminal justice cooperation and focuses on: capacity building; inter-regional cooperation; and institutional integrity. Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Nigeria are the African countries involved in this project. Under the CRIMJUST project it was Launched the initiative Justice and Law Enforcement Accountability Dashboard (JustLEAD) developed by Transparency International. The aim is to identify and address integrity gaps in criminal justice

institutions fighting organised crime and drug trafficking in a number of countries along the cocaine route⁴⁷.

COLIBRI is a new project (2019-2021) implemented within the framework of the Cocaine Route Programme that targets specifically General Aviation (GA). The aim is to build the capacities of customs officials and their relevant law enforcement partners, by strengthening the international and interdepartmental coordination and the information sharing. Specific objectives are: Monitor and control GA along the entire length of the cocaine route; assist Customs administrations and its partners involved in combating cross-border fraud with effective control procedures; step up the regional, international and interdepartmental cooperation; development and implementation of modern risk analysis, targeting and control techniques.

The EU also financed the project “Support to ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illicit drug trafficking, organized crime related to it and drug abuse in West Africa” to contribute to the reduction of drug abuse, illicit drug trafficking and related organized crime in West Africa through the implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan 2008-2015 as well as the 2016-2020, now under execution in cooperation with UNDOC. The responsibility for the implementation and the oversight of the EU-ECOWAS project lies in UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa (ROSEN). The project aims; enhance the availability of reliable and comparable data on drugs for the development of evidence-based drug policies and programs; strengthen regional capacity to identify and disseminate best practices on drug demand reduction; enhance the capacity of judicial and enforcement authorities and strengthen sub-regional and regional cooperation and coordination.

EU also support to G5 Sahel Joint Force contributing to the establishment of effective state control in areas affected by armed and criminal groups in order to create favourable conditions for the socio-economic development in the Sahel⁴⁸. This support is part of the EU's integrated approach to the region and complementary to ongoing development activities, including under the EU Trust Fund for Africa and other actions under the instrument to Stability and Peace. EU contribution is additional to the support by other donors, including Norway, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the US, as well as the five G5 Sahel countries.

US-Africa Cooperation.

The 2012 US strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa was centred around four main pillars: 1) strengthening democratic institutions; 2) spurring economic growth, trade and investment; 3) advancing peace and security and 4) promoting development. Cooperation with Africa's RECs was not a US strategic goal but was presented as a horizontal approach under the “Spur Economic Growth, Trade, and Investment” and “Advance Peace and Security” pillars (White House 2012). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) gave a prominent role to regional organisations in its strategic planning, considering that regional integration will further economic

⁴⁷ <https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/JustLEAD>

⁴⁸ <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/eu-support-g5-sahel-joint-force>

development and stability in Africa, as well as attempting to better integrate USAID and the State Department while more effectively harnessing American resources and cooperating with allies. USAID signed an Assistance Agreement for Comprehensive Regional Development with the EAC and development cooperation agreements with the ECOWAS Commission. However, USAID first identified issues and policy areas and then find the appropriate partners in line with the project-based approach of the organisation (Kotsopoulos and Goerg 2015).

On 12 December 2018 the Trump Administration's presented the New Africa Strategy. The strategy addresses three core US interests on the continent: 1) advancing U.S. trade and commercial ties with nations across the region to the benefit of both the United States and Africa; 2) countering the threat from Radical Islamic Terrorism and violent conflict. 3) ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars for aid are used efficiently and effectively. When presenting the new strategy, the National Security Advisor, Ambassador John R. Bolton, said "we will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful, and unaccountable UN peacekeeping missions"⁴⁹ and "every dollar of aid we spend will further U.S. priorities in the region". The strategy pretends to strengthened the U.S. base, Camp Lemonnier, which supports critical U.S. operations to counter violent terrorist organizations in East Africa. The fight against terrorism is the priority, and the fight against other transnational crimes is perceived as complementary to the first purpose. But the US administration continue to support former programs devoted to reinforce African security authorities' capacities.

The United States International Law Enforcement Academy programme delivers specialized courses for criminal justice officials from West and Central Africa on counter-narcotics, anti-corruption, financial crimes and border security, among other related topics. Through three of its facilities, including the United States West Africa Regional Training Center in Ghana and the United States International Law Enforcement Academies in Botswana criminal justice officials are trained. In Ghana, the United States Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs supports Ghana's police service to launch drug law-enforcement units in four strategic regions to strengthen its capacity.

In the Gulf of Guinea, US support the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct to address illicit maritime activity⁵⁰. Partnering with INTERPOL, US assistance to that regional initiative includes assistance for maritime law enforcement agencies in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria and support the efforts to investigate maritime-based organized crime, improve information sharing, strengthen maritime interdiction and investigation capabilities. The United States Africa Command also partners with those countries to support maritime training and operations such as the Obangame Express (OE)⁵¹ exercise and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)⁵².

⁴⁹ <https://er.usembassy.gov/president-donald-j-trumps-africa-strategy-advances-prosperity-security-and-stability/>

⁵⁰ http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf

⁵¹ OE takes place in the Gulf of Guinea with signatory nations of the Yaunde Code of Conduct and includes 20 African partners, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Cabo Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bassau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal,

AMLEP directly supports the AFRICOM's Campaign to counter Illicit Trafficking and to improve overall Maritime Security.

These efforts include to help African countries countering human, weapons, and drug trafficking, maritime pollution, oil bunkering, piracy/kidnapping, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. In 2018 US State Department supported a transnational initiative against organized crime to promote intelligence-led policing and investigations, interdiction and seizures of illicit drugs, organized-crime prosecutions and capacity building for security and law enforcement agencies in partnership with UNODC. In Benin and Togo the State Department has invested to build the capacity of magistrates to prosecute drug trafficking and related cases through mentorship, technical assistance and collaborative training sessions. Also, in Benin, US provide training and equipment to the national police to stem drug trafficking across Benin's land borders and waterways. The US supports training in evidence-based best practices for officials who work on drug use prevention, treatment and recovery services throughout the African continent. US supports also the G5 Sahel Joint Force, comprised of Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mali, which is seeking to build regional capability to combat terrorism, transnational organized crime, and human trafficking in the Sahel.

US- Latin America Cooperation.

At the multilateral level, the largest anti-drug cooperation instrument created by CICAD is the mentioned Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) established in 1999. It's composed by a group of intergovernmental experts (GEG) that defined, through a set of 51 indicators, the components of national anti-drug policies to be monitored and generates periodic reports to measure the efforts made at the national, regional and hemispheric levels. This joint monitoring initiative provided an alternative source to the unilateral system established by the United States to grant certification and had been highly criticized, since it is the basis for the application of retaliatory measures in the area of international aid. The fact that the US agreed to sponsor the initiative was a major step forward for the regional multilateral system, although the American authorities periodically continue to make their own unilateral assessments.

The CICAD reports are based on four main sections: institutional strengthening of counter-narcotics plans and programs; demand reduction; supply reduction, production and alternative development programs; improved measures to control illicit trafficking in drugs, firearms and money-laundering legislation; and general commitment. The experts prepare public recommendations at the national, regional and hemispheric levels, and in the event of repeated non-compliance with the recommendations, a dialogue will be established with the country to encourage it to request the support it needs. In 2000, the Inter-American Observatory on Drugs (OID) was created to advise CICAD member states on the preparation of the statistics and information necessary

Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo. <https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/obangame-express>

⁵² <https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-cooperation/africa-maritime-law-enforcement-partnership-amlep-program>

for proper follow-up to enable comparable studies. It should also serve as a warning mechanism in the event of possible changes in the operations of drug traffickers or the appearance of new related phenomena. A Solidarity Fund was also established to facilitate the participation of States that do not have sufficient financial means. The OID cooperates actively with the European EMCDDA, the UNODC, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) to harmonize indicators in the areas of drug use and drug treatment. The OID also is cooperating actively with COPOLAD in the development of methodologies for examining new threats and the development and strengthening of early warning systems.

The MEM conducts five-year Follow-up Rounds that produce Hemispheric reports in which policy advances and setbacks are analysed in depth. The last hemispheric report of 2015 corresponding to the sixth round of MEM evaluation was based on the standard recommendations emanating from the 2011-2015 Action Plan of the Hemispheric Drug Strategy, both approved in 2010. The report concludes that "the highest level of total compliance was found in the area of Control Measures, with 52%, followed by 47% in the area of International Cooperation, as well as 45% and 39% in the areas of Institutional Strengthening and Demand Reduction, respectively. The Supply Reduction area has 62% of the recommendations fulfilled, taking into consideration only those countries that have relevant illicit crops" (CICAD, 2015).

To date, the OAS has limited itself to monitoring the application of existing international standards, developing criteria and codes of conduct for policy harmonization, and technical cooperation to help governments implement existing commitments. There has been no questioning of the current model, which emphasizes eradication, interdiction and repression measures, nor has there been an evaluation of the results obtained that goes beyond the quantitative criteria of the MEM. Sub-regional approaches to the fight against drug trafficking are not examined either, so there the question of complementarity is not taken into account in the reports.

CICAD's Supply Reduction Unit (SRU/CICAD) aims to strengthen the capacities to investigate and prosecute the production, sales and trafficking in illicit drugs in the region. These activities include counter maritime narcotrafficking, antidrug controls in ports, reducing the diversion of chemical precursors, and disrupting the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs. Through the Regional Counterdrug Intelligence School of the Americas (ERCAIAD), and the Caribbean Counterdrug Intelligence Training School, the Unit analysts and investigators from around the Hemisphere in the development, analysis and exchange of counterdrug intelligence. On the other hand, the Group of Experts on Maritime Narcotrafficking trains counterdrug officials in the detection, investigation, and interdiction of maritime drug trafficking.

Sustainable Alternative Development in one of the lines of action of the Institutional Strengthening Unit that promotes the development of institutional capacities in OAS member states, facilitating the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies. The establishment Group of Experts on Comprehensive and Sustainable Alternative Development (GEDAIS) was approved by CICAD in November 2015. The objective is strengthening alternative development interventions in all of its planning phases (design, execution, systematization, evaluation), achieving the

implementation of programs, projects and activities of CICAD Member States. The group is mainly working in the development of indicators/measurement systems in the area of alternative development and discussed how to align these indicators with the UN SDGs using a broad concept of alternative development. GEDIMA also is working in improving local management of drug policies in the context of development. These programs are financed by member States and international donor community (including the US and the EU) giving priority to horizontal cooperation through mechanisms of consultation, coordination and joint action.

Apart from Hemispheric Cooperation through the OAS, the influence of the US has been decisive for the continent's anti-drug strategy since the Reagan Administration launched the war on drugs in 1983, including pressure on producing and transit countries. Thus, in 1986, the US Congress established a system of unilateral certification of countries, which implied the withdrawal of financial aid to those states that, in its opinion, did not comply with international commitments in the fight against the cultivation, production and illegal trafficking of drugs. Since then the fight against narco-trafficking and most of the counter-narcotics actions in the hemisphere had been designed and funded by the United States (Interamerican Dialogue, 2001). The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has been working in several countries bilaterally but also in regional initiatives.

As the main producer of cocaine, Colombia has been a priority for US anti-drugs strategy. The Plan Colombia created in 1999 by the agreement of President Andrés Pastrana and Bill Clinton was conceived as an anti-narcotics strategy but also as a contribution to ending the armed conflict in Colombia. In practice, the program was concentrated in reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics and provide military aid to fight against the guerrilla (CRS, 2019). The use of aerial spraying with the herbicide glyphosate to eradicate coca crops has been questioned because, in addition to causing damage to licit crops, it affected biodiversity and has adverse health consequences on those exposed to herbicides (Isacob, 2019). The use of military forces to confront the problem was also objected and accused to be the cause to spread the conflict to the surrounding countries (Transnational Institute, 2007). Plan Colombia results in terms of counternarcotic is doubtful, as according the DEA's National Drug Threat Assessment for 2017 Colombia remains the dominant producer of cocaine and is the source for 95% of cocaine seized in the United States.

In February 2016, Presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Barack Obama announced a new chapter of the Colombia plan, calling it "Peace Colombia" in reference to the support to the Agreement signed by the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Peace Colombia should focus future assistance under three pillars: 1) consolidating and expanding progress on security and counter narcotics while reintegrating the FARC into society; 2) Expanding state presence and institutions to strengthen the rule of law and rural economies, especially in former

conflict areas; and 3) Promoting justice and other essential services for conflict victims.⁵³

Formal implementation of the peace accord chapter on drug eradication and crop substitution began in late May 2017 with collective agreements committing communities to replace their coca crops with licit crops. In May 2017, US Congress approved the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which funded the various programs of Peace Colombia at \$391.3 million (CSR, 2019a)⁵⁴. Although initially President Trump announced cuts in the program, after the election of the conservative President Duque the commitment was renewed; at the US-Colombia High Level Dialogue in March 2018 was announced the objective to reduce Colombia's cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50% of current levels by 2023. President Duque is determined to implement a more aggressive approach to fight drugs activities and authorized police to confiscate and destroy any quantity of drugs found and the restoration of the forced eradication by fumigation.

US agencies provided a broad range of assistance to improve the effectiveness of Colombian counternarcotics forces. For example, funded the creation and training of the Colombian Army's counternarcotics brigades and provided training and expertise to the Colombian National Police's Junglas unit. Also funded the construction of the Colombian National Police training facility and provided a broad array of programs designed to improve the operational capabilities. US agencies provided equipment for the Colombian forces as a fleet of aircraft, patrol boats; protective gear; and specialized navigation, communications, and surveillance equipment for the Colombian National Police. The US Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) has provided a range of assistance to help reform the Colombian judicial system and improve its ability to prosecute crimes. Several U.S. agencies supported Colombian interdiction efforts by assisting with detecting and monitoring of drug trafficking operations provided assistance to strengthen Colombia's maritime and riverine interdiction capabilities.

US also supported alternative development programs in Colombia that achieved positive results in increasing opportunities to participate in the legal economy in Colombia, but have also faced issues that reduced their effectiveness "including problems with project design, program funding not being sustained for adequate periods, and a lack of consistent support from the Colombian government" (GAO, 2018).

Due the mixed results of the US Drug cooperation with Colombia, in December 2018 the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended a comprehensively

⁵³ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact-sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership-between-united-states-and>

⁵⁴ The allocation wa: \$187 million to build government presence, encourage crop substitution to replace drug crops and provide other assistance to conflict victims, including Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities; \$143 million with a focus on manual eradication of coca crops, support for the Colombian National Police, and judicial reform efforts; \$10 million for Colombian forces' training to counterparts in other countries; \$38.5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and \$21 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.

review of the US approach⁵⁵. The study concluded that only the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has evaluated some of its Alternative Development programs, but the Department of State effectiveness of its eradication and interdiction activities haven't been assessed. The study concludes that "U.S. agencies should consider what combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development activities will help to best achieve their counternarcotic goals."

Mexico is the other hot point of US counternarcotic bilateral cooperation because this country role as the main transit for cocaine from Colombia to US. In 2006 the new elected Mexican President Calderon declared the war against the Drugs and called the army to play an important role against Traficant's cartels. Mexico and US government announced the Plan Mérida as an antinarcotic's bilateral cooperation program. At the beginning the initiative consisted mainly in provide equipment, and specially for aircraft forces. Then was structured in four pillars: Dismantle Criminal Organizations; Reinforcing the rule of law; building a 21st Century Border; and support strong and resilient civil society. The Plan Merida didn't achieve to reduce drug trafficking and neither the shipment of guns to Mexico due, among other reasons to the modest amounts provided by the US, the corruption of Mexican police and the complexity of the criminal connections (Weintraub and Wood, 2010).

As part of the route from Colombia to Mexico, Central América suffers the consequences of the transnational crime proliferation, especially in the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador). In 2010 it was launched the Central América Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to attract international aid to support Security Policies in the region. The US Strategy for Engagement in Central America⁵⁶ was designed in three pillars to; promoting good governance, economic prosperity, and improved security. But the balance of aid has shifted "toward security efforts and away from governance and economic growth programs" (Meyer, 2018). US supported security assistance programs include foreign assistance account for counternarcotic and civilian law enforcement efforts and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).

A number of US cooperation activities have been developed also to improve the quality and strengthen the capacity of the National Policies improving police academy curricula and training, and enhance police engagement with civil society or also funding regional efforts to employ intelligence-led policing, such as the expansion of the comparative statistics model (COMPSTAT). Other programs aim to maintain specialized law enforcement units that work with U.S. personnel to investigate and disrupt the operations of transnational gangs and organized crime networks. But USAID interventions also include prevention programs to create safe spaces for families and young people, to identify the youth most at risk of engaging in violent behaviour and to reduce gang affiliation.

Congress placed conditions on assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras since 2016 in an attempt to bolster political will in the region improving border security,

⁵⁵ <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-106>

⁵⁶ <https://www.state.gov/u-s-strategy-for-central-america/>

including preventing illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking, and trafficking of illicit drugs and other contraband activities and to facilitate the return, repatriation, and reintegration of illegal migrants arriving at the southwest border of the United States who do not qualify for asylum. But in March 2019 the Trump Administration announced its intention to end US foreign assistance to those countries due to the continued flow of migrants and asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle (CRS, 2019b).

Convergence in values, diverse strategies and fragmented policies.

The evolution and consolidation of the Human Security concept favoured a progressive convergence on the security paradigms prevalent in the Atlantic Area. A more people-centric vision of Security led to an extension of the agenda that addresses the consequences of international crime in people's life. The United Nations has been the main driver for the expansion of the concept of Human Security and to incorporate it into the Development Agenda. The SDGs reaffirm this pattern in the SDG 16, but also with the inclusion of aspects related to multidimensional security in other objectives of the 2030 Agenda (Sanahuja, 2019).

The emerging development-security nexus agenda has been followed by a process of institutional fragmentation in multiple regional and subregional Security cooperation spaces. These initiatives seek to consolidate their own identity while contributing to the global agenda. The US remains a decisive actor in the Security agenda, especially in the more traditional aspects, but new spaces for intra and interregional cooperation have been opened and specially concerning to the non-traditional threats. The complexity, fragmentation and overlap of defence and security institutions resulted in the co-existence of differentiated models of cooperation and integration that "although they may achieve relative successes, are quite weakened" (Bragatti, 2019) by fragmentation.

However, the development of the different initiatives has also opened more spaces for interregional cooperation that favour multilateralism and the dissemination of principles, laws and practices and the incorporation of non-governmental actors. As regards the current Security Strategies like the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Roadmap 2016–2020, the 2016 EU Global Strategy for the European Union's foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) and even the 2017 "America First Foreign Policy: America Great Again" embrace the broader Human Security concept. Even if the concrete strategies and policies diverge, all of them include nontraditional Security issues like the international organized crime as part of the main threats to be addressed by the International Security Agendas. Also, the CELAC initiatives (now in crisis) and ECOWAS and other African RECs identify the Drug trafficking as one of the more concerning security threats and developed specific strategies to fight against the criminal networks. In all of these strategies, international cooperation is considered a cornerstone, including the interregional relations with other institutions.

The world drug problem has been a priority in the political dialogue and cooperation on security issues in transatlantic and hemispheric relations based on the principle of shared responsibility. The exchange of point of views and the visions and approaches

of the different countries and actors involved have been coming closer together and favoured the development of regional strategies that include a broader vision of the problem. But the importance given to the fight against illicit drug trafficking is not the same in the major security strategies developed in the Atlantic area. Cooperation in this area has evolved and broadened its areas of work. In this process of exchange, the visions and approach of the different countries and actors involved have been coming closer together, but the European, North American, Hemispheric and African strategies place different emphasis on the intensity and focus of the problem.

In the 2017 Trump`s Security Strategy unilateral action and primacy of national interest is prevalent and international cooperation is approached as a zero-sum game. The fight Against International crime is clearly identified as a national threat and specific regional strategies are designed. The US 2019 “National Drug Control Strategy”, establishes three fundamental elements (prevention, treatment and recovery, and reducing availability) as complementary and mutually supporting. But the chapter on reducing the availability show a defensive approach focused on the interdiction and punishment of the transnational crime.

The OAS 2003 Declaration on Security recognized transnational organized crime and the global drug problem as main Security threats and stressed that subregional and regional integration processes should contribute to the security. The 2009 Hemispheric Drug Strategy and the last OAS Hemispheric Plan of action on Drugs 2016-2020 characterize the world drug problem as an increasingly complex, dynamic and multi-causal phenomenon and acknowledges the connection with the 2030 Agenda. The Supply Reduction Plan also call for the design and implementation of long-term programs aimed at rural and urban alternative, integral and sustainable development programs.

EUGS also stress the necessity to promote a rules-based global order to manage interdependence and root causes of conflict and work with core partners and regional groupings. The attention to the problem of drugs in the EUGS is very limited but the EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 promote external cooperation for an integrated, balanced and evidence-based approach to drug demand reduction and drug supply reduction. The EU and its Member States are committed to integrate the EU Drugs Strategy and its objectives within the EU`s overall foreign policy framework as part of a comprehensive approach. The Action Plant on Drugs 2017-2020 also calls for integrate drug issues within the political dialogues and framework agreements and in the EU advocacy on global challenges and better coordination in international fora including the UN General Assembly.

The 2016 APSA Roadmap 2016 establishes specific objectives to fight against illicit flows and the AU Plan of Action on drug control (2013-2017) outlines four key priority areas: oversight, reporting and evaluation; evidence-based services to address health and social impact of drug use; reduce illicit trafficking and supply in accordance with fundamental human; and capacity building in research and data collection. ECOWAS has been also implementing his own Drug Action Plan to Address Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes (2016-2020) and focuses on reinforcement of the region`s capacity to fight drug trafficking, drug abuse and crime.

As seen, in all regions of the Atlantic, have been developed specific Strategies for the fight against the world drug problem and regional and interregional cooperation are of crucial importance to fulfil the objectives. Interregional Cooperation programs evidence some overlapping initiatives, but also common trends can be found in the interregional initiatives analysed. During more than two decades, the EU-LAC cooperation has developed, on the one hand, projects aimed at the control of substances and trafficking and, on the other hand, has established some international cooperation projects for alternative development focused mainly on the Andean area. Previous specific programs were redressed into the "Cocaine Route" Program created in 2011. This initiative aims to coordinating the actions of law enforcement and the judiciary from the Americas to Europe through West African countries with a set of programs to improve synergies between all elements of the fight against international criminal networks. In offer reduction Alternative Development activities have been carried out mainly through programs carried out in collaboration with UNODC.

In Africa, the EU also provides funding and capacity building for the AU, SADC, the EAC and ECOWAS. In the context of the Cocaine Route Program the EU collaboration are ongoing in collaboration with other international institutions. The EU and Interpol supported the creation of WAPIS for better information sharing and CRIMJUST-UNODC aims to strengthening criminal investigation in cooperation with INTERPOL and Transparency International. The EU also financed the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan 2016-2020, in cooperation with UNDOC and the G5 Sahel Joint Force and other actions under the instrument to Stability and Peace and the EU Trust Fund for Africa with other donors.

In the 2012 US strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa cooperation with Africa's RECs was not a US strategic goal, but regional organizations had a role in its strategic planning. The US administration continue to finance programs devoted to reinforce African security authorities' capacities through different programs and institutions. With INTERPOL, US gives assistance for maritime law enforcement agencies supports the AFRICOM's Campaign to counter Illicit Trafficking and in partnership with UNODC, US support a transnational initiative against organized crime to promote intelligence-led policing and investigations. US supports also the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

MEM is the main cooperation instrument between US and Latin America and provide the information for the CICAD to prepare public recommendations at the national, regional and hemispheric levels. The OID cooperates actively with the European EMCDDA, the UNODC, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and with COPOLAD. CICAD's Supply Reduction Unit strengthen the capacities to prosecute the production and trafficking in illicit drugs through counter maritime narcotrafficking and antidrug controls in ports. The Caribbean Counterdrug Intelligence Training School and the Group of Experts on Maritime Narcotrafficking trains counterdrug officials. Sustainable Alternative Development is the objective of GEDAIS group achieving the implementation of programs and working in the development of indicators/measurement systems compatible with the UN SDGs.

The precedent overhaul picture shows the complexity of the multiple bodies with overlapping competences and the difficulty to deal with hybrid institutional structures in

a multi-level cooperation with variable geometries. But the practice also gives the evidence that regional and transregional cooperation may influence the shared knowledge and understanding and a process of norm convergence with the creation of new mechanisms and institutions of governance that go beyond traditional forms of state-led, treaty-based regimes” including multi-actor perspectives.

The programs analysed show a high degree of coincidence in the objectives that include different aspects related to the fight against the world drug problem. In all the action plans it is planned to seek a balanced action between the measures of supply reduction and demand reduction and also the necessary protection of human rights and the rule of law is incorporated. Most strategies mention too the need to link the fight against drug trafficking with medium and long-term development programs. All this indicate a convergence in the incorporation of the principles and objectives included in the concept of Human Security. However, the practice shows a prevalence of programs aimed at controlling and repressing flows and the difficulty of implementing Alternative Development programs.

This is part of a more general problem related to the failed strategies of the current international regime in relation to the treatment of drug use and production. After decades of prohibitionist strategies, the fight against production and consumption of drugs has not paid off and the problem today is bigger than ever. In March 2019, the UN Narcotics Commission adopted a new ministerial declaration in which the disagreements between different countries on the current strategies were evident. However, nothing changed and the existing commitments were reiterated. In the absence of an agreement to renew the global strategy, interregional cooperation offers an opportunity to test experiences and provide evidences to help move towards a more effective strategy that incorporates the fight against international traffic into the Development Agenda in line with the SDGs. The Atlantic area, with all its complexity, offers a laboratory to advance in more articulated and effective strategies to shape Human Security Strategies aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals.

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ANNEX

GENERAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

US - National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017
AU- African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Roadmap 2016
EU- Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016
Central American Security Strategy in December 2007
ECOWAS - Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) 2008
SADC- Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defense, Politics and Security, 2010
OAS Declaration on Security, 2003

DRUG STRATEGIES

US - National Drug Control Strategy, 2019
OAS- Hemispheric Drug Strategy, 2009
Hemispheric Plan of action on Drugs 2016-2020, 2016

AU - Plan of Action on drug control (2013-2017), 2013
SADC- Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs in the Southern Africa, 1996
ECOWAS- Regional Action Plan to address the growing problem of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa (2015-2020), 2015

EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020, march 2013.
EU Action Plan on Drugs 2017-2020, July 2017

MAIN INTRAREGIONAL INSTRUMENTS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

AU

Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows.
Data Collection and Registration Centres (DACORE)
African Police Cooperation Mechanism (AFRIPOL).

SADC

Organ for Politics, Defence and Security.
Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO).

ECOWAS

Integrated Maritime Strategy.
Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for West Africa (ARIN-WA)
West African Police Information System (WAPIS)
G5 Sahel and the Joint Force Sahel Alliance
West Africa Coast Initiative
Container Control Program
Network of West African Central Authorities and Prosecutors against Organized Crime

OAS

Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)

Department of Public Security (DPS)
Department Against Transnational Organized Crime (DDOT)
Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM)
Inter-American Observatory on Drugs (OID)
Group of Experts on Comprehensive and Sustainable Alternative Development (GEDAIS)
Intra-regional dialogue on alternative development.

UNASUR

- South American Council on the World Drug Problem.
- South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime.
-

PROSUR - Forum for the Progress of South America.
AMERIPOL, the Community of Police of America.
GAFILAT -Financial Action Task Force of South America.
RRAG - Latin-American regional Asset Recovery Network.

Central América Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)

UE

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)
RETOIX Network
EUROPOL
EUROJUST
European perspective on Alternative Development.
EU POLICY CYCLE – EMPACT Priorities

MAIN INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION PROGRAMS IN AGAINST DRUG TRAFFIKING

EU-LAC- West Africa

“Cocaine Route” Programme

- Airports Programme (AIRCOP)
- Sea Ports Control Programme (SEACOP)
- Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support (CORMS)
- Strengthening criminal investigation and criminal justice cooperation along the cocaine route in Latin America, the Caribbean and West Africa (CRIMJUST) (with UNDOC)

UE-ALC

Cooperation Programme between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD)
UE-GAFILAT
EL PAcCTO -Europe-Latin America program was launched for Assistance against Transnational Organized Crime.
Support to Central América Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)

UE-Africa

Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the European Union on Peace, Security and Governance.
AML/WA project
WAPIS with Interpol.



COLIBRI

Support to ECOWAS Regional Action Plan 2016-2020 in cooperation with UNDOC.

Support to G5 Sahel Joint Force

EU Trust Fund for Africa (with other donors)

US- Africa

Law Enforcement Academy program.

West Africa Regional Training Center.

United States International Law Enforcement Academies.

Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

Assistance for maritime law enforcement with INTERPOL

African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)

Obangame Express (OE)

US support a transnational initiative against organized crime to promote intelligence-led policing with UNODC.

Training and equipment to the national policies by bilateral programs.

Support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

US- Latin America

Solidarity Fund to participate in MEM process.

Regional Counterdrug Intelligence School of the Americas (ERCAIAD),

The Caribbean Counterdrug Intelligence Training School.

Group of Experts on Maritime Narcotrafficking

GEDAIS Projects and the measure System for Alternative Development.

US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) bilateral programs.

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)

Peace Colombia

US Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT)

Support to Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)

Former Plan Merida